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In 1991, the Chicago law firm of Pope &John Ltd. established a lecture
series at Northwestern University School of Law. The Pope &John Lecture on Professionalismfocuses on the many dimensions of a lawyer's
professional responsibility, including legal ethics, public service, professional civility, pro bono representation,and standards of conduct. The
Journalof CriminalLaw & Criminology presents the October25, 1997
Pope &John Lecture by Professor Yale Kamisar, which is followed by
three respondingcommentaries.

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE:
THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE
COMPELLING, HEARTWRENCHING CASE
YALE KAMISAR"

I. INTRODUCTION

On the questionyou ask depends the answeryou get.'
Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld New York and
Washington state laws prohibiting the aiding of another to
commit suicide,2 the spotlight will shift to the state courts, the
. Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan
Law
School.
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 484 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,in BENCHMARxs 318-19
(1967).
2Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997). See generally Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: FacingDeath After Glucksberg
and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 885 (1998); Brett Feinberg, Note, The Court Upholds A State
Law ProhibitingPhysician-AssistedSuicide, 88J. CRiM. L. & CRIM[NOLOGY 847 (1998) (this
issue).
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state legislatures and state referenda. And once again proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) will point to a heartwrenching case, perhaps the relatively rare case where a dying
person is experiencing unavoidable pain (i.e., pain that not
even the most skilled palliative care experts are able to mitigate), and ask: What would you want done to you if you were in
this person's shoes?
That is a hard question for opponents of PAS to answer,
but, as I shall try to spell out in this article, I think it is the
wrong question to ask. To put it another way, I think it is a very
different question than one which asks: Should we enact a law
allowing PAS under certain circumstances?
Different people oppose the legalization of PAS (or physician administered active voluntary euthanasia) for different reasons. I believe that what John Arras said of the twenty-four
persons who made up the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law (New York Task Force)-all of whom wound up
opposing the legalization of PAS/euthanasia 3 -applies to opponents of PAS/euthanasia generally. As Professor Arras pointed
out, the opponents fall into three major camps:
First, those who believe the practices are "inherently immoral." Second, those who are greatly disturbed by the fact
that "physicians are being called upon to do the killing," a development they view as "fatally compromis[ing] the physicianpatient relationship."5 Third, those who recognize that in certain rare instances PAS/euthanasia might constitute "a positive
good," but nevertheless "shrink from endorsing" these practices
because they fear the "social consequences" of legalization.6
Professor Arras has disclosed that during his tenure with the
New York Task Force he belonged to the third faction. So do
1.8

s See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAw, WHEN DEATH
IS

(May 1994)
[hereinafter NEWYORKTASKFORCE REPORT].
'John D. Arras, Physician-AssistedSuicide: A Tragic View, 13J. CONTE p. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 361, 367-68 (1997).
' Id. at 368.
6 m.
Id. at 368 n.26.
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT

' See Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 975-77 (1958).
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For those of us whose opposition ,to the legalization of
PAS/euthanasia is based on grounds that put us in the third
camp, the heartwrenching case, e.g., a person enduring the last
stages of ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease) who, barely able to speak,
begs for immediate death, is especially troublesome. Indeed,
the heartwrenching case is a principal reason why there is so
much support for PAS/euthanasia in this country.
All too often a reporter believes that the way to provide an
in-depth treatment of the subject is to set forth a detailed account
of a particularindividual begging for assistance in committing
suicide-a detailed, poignant account that blots out what might
be called societal or public policy considerations. And all too
often, I suspect, when asked by pollsters about their views on the
issue, people focus on the compelling case for PAS/euthanasia
they have read or heard about-with nary a thought about the
societal consequences of legalizing the practice.
As Professor Arras has pointed out, whether we maintain
the total prohibition against PAS/euthanasia or whether we lift the
ban for certain groups of people, "there are bound to be 'victims.' 9 Continues Arras:
The victims of the current policy are easy to identify: they are on the
news, the talk shows, the documentaries, and often on Dr. Kevorkian's
roster of so-called "patients." The victims of legalization, by contrast, will
be largely hidden from view; they will include the clinically depressed
eighty-year-old man who could have lived for another year of quality if
only he had been adequately treated, and the fifty-year-old woman who
asks for death because doctors in her financially stretched HMO cannot,
or will not, effectively treat her unrelenting, but mysterious pelvic pain..
10

Arras, supra note 4, at 386. See also Seth Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean ProKevorian?: An Essay on Roe, Casey and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803, 807

(1995). As Kreimer explains:
Assisted suicide presents our society with a fearsome dilemma. Forbidding [it]
leaves some citizens with the prospect of being trapped in agony or indignity
from which they could be delivered by a death they desire. But permitting [it]
risks the unwilling or manipulated death of the most vulnerable members of society, and the erosion of the normative structure that encourages them, their
families, and their doctors to choose life.
Id.

10See Arras, supra note 4, at 386-87. A case quite similar to the one suggested by
Arras (and perhaps the very one he had in mind) occurred in Michigan. Ellen Ruth
Ward, a 69-year-old woman, suffered from a persistent pelvic pain that forced her to
stay in her home and led her to consider suicide. At first Medicare refused to cover
the cost of an implantable pump that would bathe Ms. Wood's spinal column in morphine. But when a Detroit newspaper publicized Ms. Wood's desperate situation,
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It is easier to say this than to keep it in mind when one is
confronted with what palliative care experts tell us is the rare
case-the case where even the most sophisticated pain relief
cannot alleviate pain." As Dr. Timothy Quill, one of the nation's most eloquent proponents of PAS, has remarked, what
those opposed to the legalization of PAS portray as a "tradeoff'
between the good of society generally and the "real suffering" of
focus" when you or
a relatively few individuals "radically changes
12
someone you love is doing the suffering.
II. How OPPONENTS OF PAS TREAT THE "HARD CASES"

What should be done about the compelling cases, those that
seem to cry out for PAS/euthanasia? A close look at the writings
of some of the most forceful and persuasive opponents of any
legalization of PAS/euthanasia discloses that they are not really
opposed to the practice in every case as much as they are to its
legalization. Thus Ezekiel Emanuel readily concedes that in
some cases, such as those where a patient must suffer despite all
available palliative care, "physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia
can offer obvious benefits-can end a life that is worse than
death." 3 However, Emanuel quickly adds:
But those cases distort the picture. The question is not about whether
intervention is right for this or that particular patient. In any given case
it may be the ethical thing to do, whatever the law says-and should be done.
Should we
The question confronting the United States is one of policy:
14
euthanasia.
broadly legalize physician-assisted suicide and

Medicare changed its position. A delighted Ms. Wood announced that with the
pump she could "get out and socialize with people." Although surgeons offered to
waive their fees and the manufacturer of the pump offered to discuss its cost, it was
reported that with hospital costs the operation would still come to about $14,000. See
Sharoney Andrews, Woman in Pain Gets OK for Pump, DETROrr FREE PRESS, Mar. 2,
1993, at 3A.
" See NEwYORKTASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 40 ("modem pain relief techniques can alleviate pain in all but extremely rare cases"). However, "a serious gap
exists between what medicine can achieve and the palliative care routinely provided
to most patients;" patients often fail to receive adequate pain relief even when effective treatments are available. Id. at 35.
12Timothy E. Quill, The Care of Last Resort, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1994, at 15. See also
Timothy E. Quill & Robert Brody, "You Promised Me I Wouldn't Die Like This!," 155
ARCHIvES INTERNAL MED. 1250-51 (1995) ("Our experience suggests that acceptable
pain relief [for dying patients] can be achieved about 98% of the time, which is reassuring unless you are unfortunate enough to be among the unrelieved 2%.").
"Ezekiel Emanuel, Whose Right to Die, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 73-78.
'4 Id. (emphasis added).
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Another bioethicist opposed to the legalization of
PAS/euthanasia, Mark Siegler, has similarly observed that although a compelling individual case for PAS/euthanasia "would
not support the legalization of such a practice," it might constitute an exception to the general prohibition. 5 However, warns
Professor Siegler, physicians who provide suicide assistance in
these compelling cases, "place themselves at legal risk-a kind
of conscientious objection to prevailing norms. " 16 (Elsewhere,
Professor Siegler has made it clear that he does not believe that
physicians who provide suicide assistance in these exceptional
cases put themselves at much legal risk. 7)
John Arras is still another commentator opposed to the legalization of PAS/euthanasia who is not unhappy about physicians engaging in these practices in exceptional cases. (Indeed,
as we shall see, it seems that Professor Arras would be more unhappy if physicians did not perform PAS/euthanasia in compelling cases.) Thus Arras concluded a recent article with "a plea
' Mark Siegler, Is There a Role for Physician-Assisted Suicide in Cancer?: No, in
ImoRTANT ADVANCES IN ONCOLOGY 281,289 (V. DeVita et al. eds, 1996).
16

Id Physicians who provide suicide assistance in compelling cases are better de-

scribed as "conscientious objectors" than as civil disobedients. "Civil disobedience"
usually takes place publicly. Although physicians who provide suicide assistance may
believe that there is an indefensible discrepancy between moral standards and the
law-on-the-books, few are likely to protest this discrepancy by providing suicide assistance openly or publicly. See generallyJames F. Childress, Civil Disobedience, Conscientious Objection, and Evasive Noncompliance: A Frameworkfor the Analysis and Assessment of
IllegalActions in Health Care, 10J. MED. & PHIL. 63, 66-69, 73 (1985).
'7 In a course of a televised debate with philosopher
Margaret Battin, Professor
Siegler remarked:
I don't think we should take the chance of legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia.., to meet the needs of that small group [those suffering "bad" deaths despite the best efforts of health professionals]. [These patients] can often find
appropriate care from physicians who are sympathetic to their needs. Those
physicians, if they assisted such patients, have never been subjected in this country to prosecution. Prosecutors have used considerable discretion in acknowledging the rights of patients and doctors to reach certain agreements between
themselves.
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer(PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1996).
To be more precise, it seems that no American jury has ever convicted a physician
of homicide for performing active voluntary euthanasia, but in the last half-century at
least four physicians have been prosecuted for engaging in such an act. Interestingly,
in two of the four cases the patient was a member of the doctor's family. SeeJames A.
Tulsky et al., A Middle Ground on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 5 CABRmGE Q.
HEALTHCARE E'rmncs 33, 33-34 (1996). Apparently no physician has ever been prosecuted for prescribing pills in order to help a patient commit suicide. See Sidney H.
Wanzer et al., The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look,
320 NEWENG.J. MED. 844, 848 (1989).
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to maintain the legal status quo." 8 And what did he mean by
the "legal status quo"? To quote Arras, it is "a regime that does
not legally sanction PAS and euthanasia, but nevertheless covertly
permits some particularly compassionate and courageous physicians to
violate the law in fear and trembling." ' 9

I think it fair to say that Arras and other prominent opponents of PAS such as Professors Emanuel and Siegler are defending the flat prohibition against PAS partly on the ground
that it is not really a flat ban-partly on the ground that "the
availability of informal practice and informally agreed-upon
'rights,"' especially in the most compelling cases, reduces the pressure to legalize these practices formally.20 Four decades ago I

took essentially the same position.2 1 Now I am a good deal less
sure which way the "availability of informal practice" cuts.

Four decades ago, the focus was on active voluntary euthanasia, rather than PAS, and in those days the highly publicized

cases usually involved a close relative who had "hastened the
death" of a seriously ill person, not a physician. But in that era,

too, there was a wide gap between the "law on the books" and
the "law in action. 22

My response, some forty years ago, was to quote with approval from a then recent book by Charles Curtis, who stated his
views on euthanasia as follows:
If the circumstances are so compelling that the defendant ought to violate the law, then they are compelling enough for the jury to violate their
oaths. The law does well to declare these homicide unlawful. It does
Arras, supra note 4, at 365.
"Id (emphasis added).
Cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YAL L.J. 1123, 1130 (1997). Writing
some months before the U.S. Supreme Court upheld state anti-assisted suicide laws in
the Glucksbergand Quill cases, Professor Sunstein observed:
The content of law depends not merely on the statute books but also on prosecutorial practice, and it is safe to say that in many cases prosecutors do not and will
not deviate their limited resources to the most benign cases of voluntary active
euthanasia. The availability of informal practice and informally agreed-upon
"rights" should relieve some of the pressure for a constitutional guarantee ....
Id.
I hasten to add that although Sunstein maintained that the Supreme Court should
not rule that laws forbidding PAS are unconstitutional, he did favor PAS as a matter
of public policy. Id. at 1126. Nevertheless, Sunstein's "relieving some of the pressure"
argument seems equally applicable whether the issue is formally legalizing PAS or
whether it is constitutionally guaranteeing PAS.
2 See Kamisar, supranote 8, at 970-72.
Id. at 970-71.
's
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equally well to put no more than the sanction of an oath in the way of an
acquittal.2

When all is said and done, Curtis may have been right. But four
decades later I cannot help wondering whether the passage
from his book that I quoted with approval is a much better example of stylish writing than of deep thinking. If I could do it
over again, I would not so quickly dismiss the complaint that
"public confidence in the administration of criminal justice is
hardly strengthened when moral issues are shifted instead of being solved, or when the law relegates to juries the function of
correcting its inequities." 4
IIL. ARE OPPONENTS OF PAS INSISTING ON STANDARDS THEY
THEMSELVES COULD NOT (AND WOULD NOT) SATISFY?

Perhaps Arras (and Emanuel, Siegler and others who balk at
the legalization of PAS/euthanasia but find it acceptable in certain individual cases) should be commended for forthrightly
admitting that should they ever suffer such a "terrible. fate"
themselves (i.e., an unavoidably painful or degrading existence
at the end of life), they "would hope to find a thoughtful, compassionate, and courageous physician to release them from their
misery."2 Nevertheless, this concession is quite troubling.
In Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, the famous British "necessity"
case, the court recognized that the defendants had been "subject to terrible temptation" and to "sufferings which might break
down the bodily power of the strongest man and try the conscience of the best,"26 yet emphatically rejected "necessity" as a
defense to criminal homicide. The court took comfort in the
notion that "[w]e are often compelled to set up standards we
cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could
not ourselves satisfy."2 (Why? one might ask.) I have taught
Dudley & Stephens many times-but never without voicing great
uneasiness about establishing or preserving criminal laws that
"we could not ourselves satisfy."

P. CURTIS, IT'SYOUR LAw 95 (1954), quoted in id. at 971.
2 Helen Silving, Euthanasia:A Study in ComparativeCriminalLaw, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
350, 354 (1954), quiddy dismissed in Kamisar, supranote 8, at 973.
2'HAREiS

Arras, supranote 4, at 368.
"Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 279 (1884).
27 dat 288.
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Yet Professor Arras and others opposed to the legalization
of PAS/euthanasia seem to be saying just that. One would think
that as a general proposition the criminal law "should correspond with the actual feelings of the community, right or
wrong,, 28 and that as another general proposition it would be
wrong "to punish what would not be blameworthy in an average
member of the community."2 How then may one take the position that we should continue to keep PAS/euthanasia criminal
under all circumstances even though we think it likely and understandable that the average person will engage in such conduct
in certain circumstances? Indeed, Arras and other opponents of
PAS/euthanasia seem to go a step further. They seem to be saying that we should neither repeal nor revise criminal laws that
people who are better than average-"compassionate, and courageous physicians"-hopefully will violate under certain circumstances.
The sympathy many opponents of PAS/euthanasia express
for what they would say are the relatively few people who suffer
an unavoidably agonizing death, and the ambivalence with
which they view these hard cases while stoutly resisting any legalization of PAS/euthanasia, has not escaped the attention-or
the displeasure--of their adversaries. A good example is Professor Sylvia Law's sharp response to some of the comments John
Pickering made in expressing his opposition to PAS/euthanasia.
At the time he chaired the American Bar Association's
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Pickering incurred strong criticism when, along the same lines as Arras and
others, he distinguished between PAS/euthanasia as public policy and PAS/euthanasia as a response to the circumstances of an
individual case. In leading the successful opposition to an attempt to have the ABA endorse proposals to legalize PAS, Pickering expressed agreement with the New York Task Force
Report that PAS/euthanasia is "unwise public policy" and that
"it poses great danger to the most vulnerable segments of our
society-the elderly, the poor and the persons with disabili-

28

OLIVERWENDELL HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark Howe ed., 1963).

Id. at 62 ("[T] o punish what would not be blameworthy in an average member of
the community would be to enforce a standard which was indefensible theoretically,
and which practically was too high for that community.").
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ties. " s° But then he added: "At the same time I selfishly reserve
my right to do in private what my family, my doctor and pastor
and I, in loving consultation, voluntarily agree is best."3 ' Sylvia
Law, a strong proponent of PAS, responded: "While [Mr. Pickering's] candor is refreshing, it may be wise to enact legal principles that are applicable to all. Formal rules, justified to
protect the vulnerable and then ignored by the powerful, are
to all, and most especially to those they purport
apt to be unfair
8 2
to protect.

Professor Law's criticism deserves a response and that is the
focus of the next section.
IV. How MEANINGFUL WILL THE SAFEGUARDS CONTAINED IN LAWS
AUTHORIZING PAS TURN OUT TO BE IN PRACTICE?
One may put the matter quite differently: Fortunately for
Mr. Pickering, if laws were passed authorizing and regulating
PAS/euthanasia, he and well-to-do people like him would be in
a position to avail themselves of the safeguards such laws are
likely to contain; unfortunately, many members of our society
(and notjust the most vulnerable ones) would not be.
Professor Law speaks of "legal principles that are applicable
to all." But here, as elsewhere, rules of general applicability may
affect different people very differently. In the criminal justice
area, for example, various rules often affect the poor more
harshly than they do the rich.3 As is well known, the Supreme
Court addressed this problem in Gideon v. Wainwrigh?' and
many other cases. 5 Unlike the criminal justice area, however,
the government is under no constitutional obligation to minimize the influence of poverty or poor economic circumstances

$0John H. Pickering, The ContinuingDebate over Active Euthanasia,A.B.
BULL, Summer 1994, at 1, 15.
31Id.

BIOETHIcs

32Sylvia Law, Physician-AssistedDeath: An Essay on ConstitutionalRights and Remedies,
55 MD. L. REV. 292, 314 (1996).
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Douglas,372 U.S. at 353; Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON POVERTYAND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POVERTY AND TmE ADMINISTRATION
FEDERAL CRIMINALJUSTICE

Prof. Francis A. Allen).
Robert F. Kennedy.

OF

(1963) (often called "the Allen Committee" after its chair,
The committee was appointed by then-Attorney General
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on the administration of the laws governing physician-assisted
death.&
It is all very well to point out that because "the differentiation of major depression from normal responses to serious illness is a highly specialized and difficult clinical task for which
few nonpsychiatric clinicians are adequately prepared,"3 7 patients who ask for a physician's assistance in committing suicide
should be seen by a psychiatrist.8 But who will pay for the psychiatrist's services?
It is all very well to emphasize that "independent and impartial oversight by a certified palliative-care consultant is a vital
safeguard in [a] proposed policy of legalized physician-assisted
death"3 9 and that, if necessary, these consultants should be able
Nor would any legislature be likely to do so. As noted in Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266 (1997), two months before the Court handed down its decisions
in the much-awaited PAS cases, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act of 1997, prohibiting the use of federal funds in support of
PAS. See id. at 2259, 2266.
- Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient Requests to Hasten Deaths,
154
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2039, 2044 (1994).

See also Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the

Request for Assisted Suicide: Meaningand Motivation, 35 DuQ. L. REV. 285, 287-88 (1996);
Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274
JAMA 483, 484 (1995); Nathan Cherny et al., The Treatment of Suffering When Patients
Request Elective Death, 10 J. PAu.IATIVE CARE 71, 73 (1994); Guy Benrubi, Sounding
Board: Euthanasia-The Needs for Procedural Safeguards, 326 JAMA 197, 198 (1992);
David C. Clark, "Rational"Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8
ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 155 (1992); Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, RationalSuicide and
the Right toDie, 325 NEwENG.J. MED. 110, 111 (1991).

"See Block & Billings, supra note 37, at 2044. However, despite "a well-known and
strong association between depression and suicide, especially for patients with cancer," the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the first act to legalize PAS in the United
States, does not require a psychiatric evaluation of patients who request PAS; it only
recommends such an evaluation if the patient's physician suspects mental illness. See
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Elisabeth Daniels, Oregon's Physician-Assisted Suicide Law: Provisions and Problems, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 825, 827-28 (1996).

" Franklin G. Miller et al., Sounding Board: Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331
NEw ENG.J. MED. 119, 121 (1994) [hereinafter Miller et al., Sounding Board]. See also

Franklin G. Miller et al., Can Physician-Assisted Suicide Be Regulated Effectively?, 24 J.L.
MED. & ETHics 225, 226 (1996) ("the most important safeguard" is consultation with
an independent palliative care expert who, interalia,would verify that "the request for
hastened death is not driven by a treatable depression, inadequate pain relief, or lack
of support."). Consider, too, Christopher James Ryan & Miranda Kaye, Sounding
Board:Euthanasiain Australia-TheNorthern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 334
NEw ENG.J. MED. 326, 327 (1996):

The Act places a strong emphasis on palliative care. Assistance [in committing
suicide] is warranted only when the best palliative care has not succeeded in relieving the pain, suffering, or distress of a terminally ill patient. Euthanasia [or, I
would add, PAS] can never be divorced from the issue of whether palliative care
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to obtain the services of additional experts to ascertain the patient's competence or medical condition or the adequacy of her
palliative care.4 But once again, who will pay for these services?
And who will pay for more effective palliative measures if existing measures are deemed to fall short?
We should keep in mind that the United States is one of the
very few industrialized nations in the world which lacks a system
of national health insurance or national health care.4' Thus the
financial aspects of death and dying loom large in this country
and the situation is grim:
Over 34 million people in the United States have no health insurance
and an additional 80 million people are estimated to be significantly
"underinsured" if faced with a serious or chronic illness .... The elderly
and minority populations are hardest hit by the constraints of a failing
health-care reimbursement system.
The uninsured and underinsured have limited access to the least
expensive modality of pain relief, such as oral analgesics, but are excluded from more recent advances in pain treatment,• such• •as 42PCA
pumps, intraspinal analgesics, and other more expensive modalities.
has been adequate, and this emphasis addresses the concern that euthanasia
might become an alternative to palliative care.
40See Miller

et al., Sounding Board,supranote 39, at 121.

See Margaret Battin, Euthanasia:The Way We Do It, The Way They Do It, 6J. PAIN &
SymProM MGMT. 298, 304 (1991). Apparently the only other exception among industrialized nations is South Africa. In sharp contrast to the United States, in the Netherlands, where PAS/euthanasia is legally tolerated,
[a]lmost all patients (99.4%) have healthcare insurance and 100% of the population is insured for the cost of protracted illness. There are no financial incentives for hospitals, physicians, or family members to stop the care for patients.
Moreover, the legal right of the patient to healthcare on the basis of his insurance will override budget and other financial agreements.
RJ.M. Dillman, Euthanasiain the Netherlands: The Role of the Dutch Medical Profession, 5
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHcARE ETHcs 100, 105 (1996).
42
Betty . Ferrell & Hurdis Griffith, Cost Issues Related to Pain Management: Report
from the Cancer Pain Panel of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, 9 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT. 210, 232 (1994). Elsewhere, the authors state that the monthly cost
of PCA morphine at home is about $4,000 per month. Id. at 226. See also Council on
Scientific Affairs, AMA, Good Care of the Dying Patient,275 JAMA 474, 476 (1996); Arras, supranote 4, at 372; Battin, supra note 41, at 304.

Consider, too, the "managed care" context in which legalized PAS would occur.
"Over sixty million Americans receive care through health maintenance organizations
(HMOs)," and HMOs are only one kind of managed care organization. Susan M.
Wolf, Physician-AssistedSuicide is the Context ofManaged Care, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 455, 455-

56 (1996). "An emerging literature expresses considerable anxiety" about how "costcontainment efforts and other features of managed care would affect the use of assisted suicide if it were legalized." Id. at 456; see also id. at 456-57 (citing authorities).
Professor Wolf's own article is an addition to that "emerging literature." She observes:
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Those favoring the legalization of PAS/euthanasia may be
irked by the fact that Pickering and other opponents do not
rule out these practices as possible options for themselves, but
this stance underscores "the distinction between the morality of
individual acts and the wisdom of social policy."4
No doubt Mr. Pickering's doctors are well trained to detect
depression (and anything else), but I think he may properly resist the legalization of PAS/euthanasia on the ground that "the
majority of individuals who kill themselves suffer from depression that is treatable with appropriate clinical care," yet "too often, clinicians fail to detect treatable depression or other
psychiatric illness, assuming that the depression is expected or
beyond treatment," and "most doctors are not adequately
in complex cases such
trained to diagnose depression especially
44
as patients who are terminally ill."

No doubt Mr. Pickering's doctors will provide the most effective and sophisticated palliative care available, but I think he
may properly resist the legalization of PAS/euthanasia on the
ground that there is good reason to believe that "current medical practice radically undertreats pain, making suicide a more
attractive option than is technologically necessary"-and "the
poor and isolated who have the least leverage in seeking relief
from the medical system will be particularly subject to this danger. "45
The case of the dying person who requests PAS because of
unbearable suffering which derives largely from her poor economic circumstances presents a terrible dilemma. One may argue that to allow physicians to perform PAS/euthanasia in such
cases would be to "make them accomplices with society's refusal
to care for its dying members. '4 6 But one may retort that to

deny patients PAS in such cases is not to avoid "complicity" with
Under the incentives in a fee-for service system, physicians profit by offering patients treatment for their illness, interventions for their depression, pain relief,
and encouragement to go on with life if possible. Under managed care incentives, physicians and organizations lose money by doing all of these things and
profit instead by encouraging patients considering assisted suicide to go ahead
with the practice.
Id. at 473.
3
Arras, supra note 4, at 373.

supra note 3, at 126-27.
" Kreimer, supranote 9, at 827.
1 SeeAlpers & Lo, supra note 37, at 485 (recognizing both horns of the dilemma).
"NEWYORKTASKFORCE REPORT,
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societal inequalities, but to magnify such inequalities 47 -and
conclude, albeit with great sadness, that PAS is "the least bad
option" for such socially disadvantaged patients.8
The dilemma presented by these cases is not easily resolvable. But I would emphasize a point made very recently by a
distinguished Committee on Care at the End of Life: offering
patients suffering from avoidable pain and other symptoms 'just
two options-either physician assistance for hastened death or
continued life with untreated pain-is a highly4 9constricted
choice that undermines the principle of autonomy.
V. How THE LEGAIZATION OF PAS Is LIKELY TO AFFECT THE
DYNAMICS OF DEATH AND DYING

The enactment of a statute authorizing and regulating
PAS/euthanasia raises problems that are likely to escape attention when the issue is debated in terms of what would be desirable in a dramatic, individual (and relatively rare) case. For
example, in the compelling case typically presented by proponents of PAS/euthanasia, and often dwelt on by the media, the
request for active intervention to bring about death, and the ensuing conversation with the physician, are patient-initiated.
This is likely to change (indeed, would probably have to change

47 See COMMlTFEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING
CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 205 (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., 1997) [hereinafter APPROACHING DEATH], a report which recognizes both horns of the dilemma.

See also the thoughtful discussion in Franklin G. Miller et al., Can Physician-Assisted
Suicide Be Regulated Effectively ?, 24J.L. MED. & ETHICs 225, 230 (1996).
See Alpers & Lo, supra note 37, at 485.
49
APPROACHING DEATH, supra note 47, at 205; see also id. at 270-71. The solution
suggested by Franklin Miller, Howard Brody and Timothy Quill when poor or socially
disadvantaged dying patients request PAS to end their avoidable pain is for their physicians to "seek emergency help in marshalling resources for such patients so they can
make use of standard palliative care to alleviate their terminal suffering." Miller et al.,
supra note 47, at 230. But I do not think this would work. Assuming arguendo that it
would, how could we decline to "seek emergency help" for other socially disadvantaged, terminally ill patients, i.e., those who are also suffering much pain because they
lack adequate financial resources but do not request PAS/euthanasia? Would the
only way for such patients to trigger efforts to obtain effective palliative care for their
terminal suffering be to request PAS/euthanasia? If (as I think unlikely) this proved to
be effective, and word spread, would all socially disadvantaged, terminally ill patients
then request PAS in order to maximize their chances of obtaining effective palliative
care (if only to revoke their requests when such care became available)?
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if these practices become lawful "medical treatment" options).5°
As the New York Task Force has pointed out:
As with other "treatments,"judgments about when and for whom assisted
suicide and euthanasia are provided would be managed principally by
physicians, not their patients.... Patients bring [a state of vulnerability
caused by serious illness] to their relationship with physicians. Physicians in turn hold the knowledge and expertise patients may desperately
need, adding to the profound dependence that characterizes the doctorpatient relationship....
If assisted suicide and euthanasia were accepted as "therapy," physicians would make a medical judgment about which patients are "good"
candidates for the practices. Physicians would also do what is routinely
called for in good medical practices-they would make a recommendation. [And these] recommendations would be a powerful factor in their
patients' choices. Indeed, patients generally do what their doctors recommend.5'

More generally, the legalization of PAS/euthanasia for certain
patients would change the way these patients and those around
them would view their lives-and the "hastening" of their
deaths.5 2
The legalization of PAS/euthanasia might lead many to re-

gard "eligible" patients who decline to pursue these options as

"responsible for their own suffering." 53 After all, it might be argued, once PAS/euthanasia becomes a lawful alternative, if a

patient declines a lethal injection or a lethal dose of barbiturates, does not her continued pain and5 4suffering become her
own decision and her own responsibility?

Moreover, the availability of PAS/euthanasia, a lawful and
therefore reasonable option under certain circumstances, would
'0The Oregon act, the first to legalize PAS in the United States, does not prohibit

physicians from being the first to bring up the subject of PAS with eligible patients.
See Alpers & Lo, supra note 37, at 485; Emanuel & Daniels, supra note 38, at 827. I
think it noteworthy that "more than half of Dutch physicians consider it appropriate

to introduce the subject of euthanasia to their patients." Herbert Hendin, The Slippery
Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 427, 428 (1996).
"' NEW YoRK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 121-22. See also Hendin, supra
note 37, at 304 (discussing the vulnerability and dependency on others of terminally
or seriously ill patients).
512
See NEwYoRK TASKFoRCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 95.
5 See Emanuel, supra note 13, at 79.
See id. "Placing the blame on the patient," adds Professor Emanuel, "would reduce the motivation of caregivers to provide the extra care that might be required,
and would ease guilt if the care fell short. Such an easy, thoughtless shift of responsibility is probably what makes most hospice workers so deeply opposed to physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia." Id.
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deny eligible candidates "the possibility of staying alive by default." 5 As one commentator has observed:
When someone shows impatience or displeasure with us, we jokingly say
"Well, excuse me for living!" But imagine that it were no joke; imagine
that living were something for which one might reasonably be thought to
need an excuse....
Unfortunately, our culture is extremely hostile to any attempt atjustifying an existence of passivity and dependence. The burden of proof
will lie heavily on the patient who thinks that his terminal illness or
chronic disability is not a sufficient reason for dying.
What is worse, family members and others to whom a patient wants
to justify his choices, are often in a position to incur severe financial and
emotional costs from any prolongation of his life. Many of the reasons
in favor of his death are likely to be exquisitely salient in their minds. I
believe that some of these people may actively pressure the patient to exercise the option of dying. (Students who hear me say this usually object
that no one would ever do such a thing. My reply is that no one would
ever do such a thing
as abuse his own children or parents-except that
56
many people do.)

If, as one sociologist has pointed out, suicidal persons are
already "succumbing to what they experience as an overpowering and unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease living,"" are not these pressures likely to increase in a society that
sanctions assisted suicide? In a society which recognizes by specific legislation that assisted suicide (and hence suicide as well)
is a rational and reasonable course of action in certain circumstances, and a society in which assisted suicide will not only be
thinkable but speakable, will it be or become the "right" thing
to do under certain circumstances? The courageous thing?
58
The disappointing or selfish or cowardly thing not to do?

Are these the kind of questions we want a gravely ill person
to ponder? Are these the kind of pressures we want to exert on
a very sick person?59 I think the point is well made in, of all
places, a letter to the editor:
To say that people will still be free to say "no" to assisted suicide [if
and when such a practice is legalized] is not enough. The state has no
right to put seriously ill, diseased, handicapped, dying people under the
burden of having to make such a decision.
-"J.David Velleman, Against the Right to Die, 17J. MED. &PHIL. 665, 673 (1992).
0 See id. at 674-75.
-7 GEORGE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 342 (1991) (quoting
Menno Boldt) ("This

sense of coercion takes many familiar forms: fear, isolation, abuse, uselessness, and so
on.").
"Cf Donald L Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmakingand Social Choice: Examining the
"Rightto Die,"77 Ky. L.J. 319, 355 (1988-89).

" See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 990-93.

1136

YALE KAMISAR

[Vol. 88

I prefer to die without being able to ask for a doctor to help me kill
myself. Come the time, I will not even want to think about that. I surely
will not want the people around me thinking I should be thinking about
that. 60

VI. Is THERE A "MIDDLE GROUND" ON PAS?
If, for the reasons discussed above, it is undesirable to enact
legislation authorizing PAS/euthanasia (even in very limited
circumstances), is there a way to countenance the genuinely
compelling cases-the heartwrenching cases that seem to cry
out for PAS/euthanasia-withoutpassing laws formally authorizing these practices? In other words, is there a "middle ground"
on PAS/euthanasia 6'-a way of tolerating the relatively few cases
that generate great sympathy without condoning the generality
of cases and without declaring, as formal legalization would, society's approval of the practice?
One of the nation's most formidable opponents of
PAS/euthanasia, Ezekiel Emanuel, would answer in the affirmative. He urges us to establish a social policy that (a) keeps
PAS/euthanasia illegal, thereby rejecting the view that a patient
has a right to such procedures, but (b) recognizes that "in exceptional cases interventions are appropriate, as acts of desperation when all other elements of treatment-all medications,
surgical procedures, psychotherapy, spiritual care, and so onhave been tried."62
"0Julius B. Poppinga, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at A6. Nan

McColloch, a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis, wrote an op-ed piece conveying her experiences. See Nan McCulloch, Editorial, Assisted Suicide Is Permission to Kili
DETROrr FREE PRESS, Mar. 25, 1994, at 13A.

A law that would allow someone to help another person kill himself or herself scares me. Such a law is directed at me personally.
There already are enormous pressures on certain people that will only grow
if we legalize assisted suicide....
I want to be free to live out my natural life even if I were useless, even if I

were to cost the state an arm and a leg through hospitalization costs and Social
Security disability payments....
My rights are threatened by the legalization of assisted suicide far more
than [the rights of a seriously ill person who favors PAS is threatened] by the illegalization of it. She already is free to kill herself....
[I] am put in the position of defending my choice to live. I, more than she,
must fear my final days at everyone else's mercy, since the road to hell is paved
with merciful acts and good intentions.
61 SeeTulsky et al., supra note 17, at 33.
6' Emanuel, supra note 13, at 79. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying
notes 33-45, and as Professor Emanuel is well aware, many seriously ill Americans lack
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Unfortunately, Professor Emanuel does not spell out how
society should go about both condemning PAS/euthanasia as a
general matter and recognizing exceptions in truly compelling
cases. I think the best reading of his article is that he would
maintain the legal status quo-and its wide gap between "the
law on the books" and the "law in action." O
Although, like Emanuel, Howard Brody would not grant
physicians the protection afforded by laws explicitly authorizing
PAS/euthanasia, he, too, would accommodate those who engage in these practices in exceptionally compelling cases.4 But
Professor Brody would not depend on the prosecutor's discretion or jury nullification. He would go a step further. According to Brody, when a compelling case arises (one where all
medical interventions have failed to achieve a "good death" and
the patient has voluntarily requested a physician-assisted death),
and a physician carries out the patient's request and is then
charged with criminal homicide or assisting in a suicide, the
physician should be able to mount a defense to these charges, a
defense called "a compassionate response to a medical failure. " 65
I do not believe that a generally worded defense to criminal
charges-such as "act[ing] compassionately and competently in
assisting a death, by ensuring that a voluntary choice was made
and that all other options for relief had been tried"%--will
change things very much, if at all. Unless physicians are told in
advance what specific steps they should take to obviate any significant risk of a criminal prosecution, those physicians who
currently balk at providing assistance in committing suicide are
unlikely to become more venturesome and those physicians who
now provide
such assistance in secret are unlikely to do so in the
67
open.
the financial resources to "try everything" before obtaining assistance in committing
suicide. How should we deal with them?
See supranotes 17-25 and accompanying text.
See Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A CompassionateResponse to A Medical Failure,
327 N. ENG. J. MED. 1384 (1992). Professor Brody does not believe that a statute
could be drafted that "would list all possible justifications and restrictions in advance"
and that the morality of assisting a patient's death is best determined "on the merits
of the specific case." Id&at 1385, 1387.
Id. at 1384.
6I6& at 1387.
"7Cf Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 33 HARV.J. ON LEGLS. 1, 8-13 (1996).
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This problem has not escaped Dr. Brody's attention. He
suggests a scheme whereby (a) arbitration boards sometimes
used to handle malpractice claims would review PAS cases, and
(b) the prosecutor's decision whether or not to charge a particular physician with a crime would be influenced by the conclusion reached by the board, i.e., a determination by the board
that the physician had a valid defense would lead the prosecution to drop the matter.6 "This legal framework," adds Brody,
"might be supplemented by intraprofessional review" whereby
physicians who have assisted in a patient's suicide "should be
called on to defend their actions against the sharpest questioning of their peers, in an open forum. " 6
Brody's goal is a laudable one-protecting physicians who
help their patients commit suicide in exceptionally compelling
cases without formally endorsing PAS-but I do not think his
scheme will work. I fail to see why prosecutors would surrender
to arbitration boards a big chunk of their precious discretion to
prosecute. Nor do I see why the prospect of appearing before
an arbitration board, to say nothing of being subjected to "the
sharpest questioning of [one's] peers," would not deter a physieven if she might othercian from performing PAS/euthanasia
70
it.
to
objection
no
wise have
In effect, Dr. Brody is asking, and expecting, courageous (or
foolhardy) physicians to step forward and contribute to the caseby-case development of the "common law" of "acting compassionately and competently in assisting a death" by putting their
careers and reputations on the line. I think very few physicians,
if any, would accommodate him.
James Tulsky, Ann Alpers and Bernard Lo are also searching for a "middle ground" on PAS. 7' They, too, balk at "formally
legalizing assisted suicide" because such a development would
"declare society's approval of the practice."7 And under certain
circumstances they, like Professor Brody, would make PAS an af60

Brody, supranote 64, at 1387.

69 Id.
70 Moreover,

I doubt that any competent lawyer would permit her client to be subjected to the "sharpest questioning" of her colleagues about her participation in a patient's suicide. Even aside from the possibility of a criminal prosecution, the risks are
considerable: bad publicity; liability for wrongful death and medical malpractice; professional sanctions; and loss of hospital staff privileges.
71SeeTulsky et al., supra note 17.
72
Id.at 35.
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firmative defense to criminal charges. But they are a good deal
more specific. Under their proposal, PAS would remain a
crime, but the act would not be punishable if the defendant
physician proved by clear and convincing evidence that the suicidal patient was (a) a competent individual who was terminally
ill, (b) suffering physical distress despite aggressive palliative
care, and (c) the request for suicide was voluntary.73
To provide sufficient evidence that all the elements of the
affirmative defense were satisfied, Tulsky, Alpers and Lo recommend, and contemplate, that the physician providing suicide
assistance would discuss the case with colleagues and other professionals to assure that the patient is competent, that she is
terminally ill, that her request for assisted suicide is stable and
firm, that she is not suffering from a treatable depression and
that her physical distress cannot be relieved by aggressive palliative care. 4 However, a physician otherwise willing to provide
suicide assistance is unlikely to consult freely with various specialists or otherwise perform PAS "in the open" unless convinced that she has proceeded so carefully and built such a
strong defense against potential criminal charges that the possibility of beingprosecutedis almost zero. Moreover, the various specialists contacted by such a physician are unlikely to want to "get

"3Id. at 38-39. At one point, the authors note that the defense would not be limited to physicians: Family members and close friends, too, could avail themselves of
this defense (although a physician would have to be involved to make the necessary
evaluation). Id. at 40. However, I put this aside for purposes of the present discussion.
Forty years ago, Glanville Williams, an eminent British legal commentator, also

proposed that the criminal law be amended to protect physicians who perform active
voluntary euthanasia. However, unlike the Tulsky-Alpers-Lo formula, Williams's pro-

posal was heavily tilted in favor of the physician:
[The amendment] would provide that no medical practitioners should be guilty

of an offense in respect of an act done intentionally to accelerate the death of a
patient who is seriously ill, unless it is proved that the act was not done in good
faith with the consent of the patient and for the purpose of saving him from severe pain in an illness believed to be of an incurable and fatal character.
GLANv=u

LLEwELYN WLLAMS, THE SANCTrrY OF LiFE AND TBE CRIMINAL LAW 340

(1957). "Under this formula," explained Williams, "itwould be for the physician, if
charged, to show that the patient was seriously ill, but for the prosecution to prove
that the physician acted from some motive other than the humanitarian one allowed
to him by law." Id.
7' See Tulsky et al., supra note 17, at 39.
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involved" in the case unless they, too, are convinced that the
chance of anyonebeing prosecuted is quite small.75
If the criminal law were amended as proposed by Tulsky,
Alpers and Lo, what would be the best way for a physician willing to provide suicide assistance to proceed? I think the safest
course would be to satisfy the conditions and follow the procedures set forth in the Model State Act76 (or some other proposed legislation)-conditions and procedures a group of
experts deem necessary to provide a patient with adequate protection.77
For example, in an effort to balance "the prevention of
hasty decisionmaking against the prolonging of unbearable suffering,"7 8 the Model State Act requires that the request for suicide assistance be in writing and that it be made on at least two
occasions that are at least two weeks apart.7 9 Moreover, in order
to assure that the patient's decision is "fully informed, free of
undue influence, and not distorted by depression,"80 the Act
mandates that a professional mental health care provider evaluate the patient.8'
A responsible physician can hardly be expected to do any
more than satisfy the procedures contained in an Act drafted by
nine highly regarded experts in law, medicine and ethics. On
the other hand, a failure to comply with the provisions of the
Act might give a prosecutor an opening. (I can almost hear the
prosecutor now, maintaining that the physician should be indicted (and then convicted) because he or she was too arrogant

7'

Cf Wanzer et al., supranote 17, at 848.
et al., supra note 67.

76 See Baron

7 Tulsky, Alpers and Lo suggest some implementing rules or guidelines of their
own. For example,'in discussing how to go about establishing the "voluntariness" of a
request for suicide assistance they comment:
A combination of facts will ordinarily suffice to establish voluntariness: the patient requested assistance with suicide on more than one occasion over a period
of time; the defendant had an ongoing relationship with the patient; and the patient had been evaluated for depression, received counseling, or had explored alternatives to suicide.
Tulsky et al., supra note 17, at 39.
,' Baron et al., supra note 67, at 18.
79 See id.

80Id
8"

For purposes of the present discussion, I put aside the question of who will pay

for the services of such an expert if the patient is uninsured and lacks adequate financial resources.
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or uncaring or incompetent to protect a terminally ill patient in
the manner deemed essential by nine experts.)
Tulsky, Alpers and Lo should be commended for trying
hard to achieve a "middle ground." But I venture to say that in
the real world their plan would wind up at one end or the other,
not in "the middle."
As discussed earlier, unless specific and detailed procedures
and conditions were developed which, if followed, would almost
guarantee that a physician would not be prosecuted, PAS/
euthanasia would continue to be performed in secret (or not at
all). But there is another, and a very different, possible outcome. Suppose the courts or the medical profession adopted
the specific provisions of the Model Act (or the new Oregon law
legalizing PAS) as a way of implementing Tulsky, Alpers and
Lo's affirmative defense. Or suppose rules or guidelines implementing the defense were developed over the years by the
courts and/or the medical profession and/or the prosecutor's
or the attorney general's office. Suppose further that these
rules or guidelines became so detailed and so dominated the
practice of death and dying that compliance with them virtually
guaranteed immunity from prosecution.82 Then a significant
number of physicians probably would practice PAS/euthanasia
in the open-fully and freely consulting colleagues and other
professionals and perhaps even ethics committees.
But this would no longer be a "middle ground." The willingness to perform PAS/euthanasia "in the open" would convey
the message that the practice was now considered ethical. 83 The
82

Of course, this state of affairs would then resemble the situation in the Nether-

lands. Although euthanasia is technically illegal in the Netherlands, indeed still specifically prohibited by Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code, the practice is "legally
tolerated" if certain conditions are satisfied. Physicians who comply with a set of
guidelines recognized by the courts and endorsed by the State Commission on
Euthanasia are not subject to sanctions. See generally HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY
DEATH: DOCFORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DUTCH CURE (1996); CARLoS F. GOMEZ,
REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991); Battin,
supra note 41, at 299; Maurice A.M. DeWachtler, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 22
HASTINGS C-. REP. 23 (1992); Dillman, supra note 41;John Keown, Euthanasiain the
Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL,
CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTrvES 261 (John Keown ed., 1995). Despite the continuing criminal prohibition against euthanasia, I believe that most people, both those inside the country and those outside, would say that under certain conditions
euthanasia is "sanctioned" or "justified"or "approved" in the Netherlands.
' Compare the remarks of Professor Mark Siegler during a televised debate with
Professor Margaret Battin, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, supra note 17. At one point
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detailed rules or guidelines implementing the defense would
have become the functional equivalent of a statute authorizing
and approving PAS/euthanasia-the very result the authors of
the proposal hoped to avoid.
VII. SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS

As we have seen, some opponents of PAS/euthanasia defend the present regime partly on the ground that it covertly permits these practices to take place in the relatively few cases
where such action is appropriate. 84 But it is not at all clear
which way this cuts. It may be contended that the availability of
what might be called the underground practice of
PAS/euthanasia reduces the pressure to legalize these acts, but
it may also be argued that the current state of affairs results in
"the worst of all worlds: unpopular laws stay on the books and
are sporadically enforced against unwary defendants, but because of the prosecutor's need to avoid a jury, the crimes are
not punished to the extent the legislature might think appropriate."t
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code has deservedly been called "the point of departure for criminal law
scholarship. "86 So I turned to the Code for help. But when I did
so, different code provisions and commentaries seemed to point
in different directions.
In rejecting the position taken by the Dudley & Stevens
court

7

and other courts which have refused to recognize as de-

Siegler voiced strong opposition to legalizing PAS/euthanasia, maintaining, inter alia,
that the small number of terminally ill patients who repeatedly request suicide assistance "can often find appropriate care from physicians who are sympathetic to their
needs." Shortly thereafter, however, Siegler expressed unhappiness with the current
state of affairs, where some PAS/euthanasia is practiced in secret. "If it were left to
me," he added, "[agreements between physicians and patients to help patients commit suicide] ought to be regulated first by being looked at in advance by a committee
of professionals and lay people .... and secondly, it ought to be looked at retrospectively in a public arena.. . ." I venture to say that if Professor Siegler's suggestion
were carried out society would in effect have "legalized" and "approved"
PAS/euthanasia under certain conditions-a state of affairs Siegler has long resisted.
84 See supratext accompanying notes 13-20.
85Andrew D. Leipold, RethinkingJury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 301 (1996).
At this point, Professor Leipold is not talking specifically about PAS/euthanasia but
about the situation generally when ajury is permitted to nullify the law.
'6 Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code's HistoricalAntecedents, 19 RUTGERS L.J.
521, 538 (1988).
s1See supratext accompanying notes 26-27.
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Lenses to criminal homicide "necessity" (sometimes called
"choice of evils") or "duress" (sometimes called "coercion"), the
Reporters for the Model Penal Code explained:
[L] aw is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed.., it is hypocritical, if it
imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic
choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to affirm that they
should and could comply with if their turn to face the problem should
arise. Condemnation in such a case is bound to be an ineffective threat;
what is, however, more significant is thai it is divorced from any moral
base and is unjust.?

These are strong words and they seem to provide strong
support for legalizing PAS/euthanasia-at least in those compelling individual cases where even some opposed to the legalization of PAS/euthanasia deem the acts appropriate. Yet,
without carving out any exceptions for compelling cases, the
Code elsewhere, to use its own description, "creates a separate
offense of aiding or soliciting suicide,"8 explaining:
The fact that penal sanctions will prove ineffective to deter [a suicidal
individual from committing the act himself] does not mean that the
criminal law is equally powerless to influence the behavior of those who
would aid or induce another to take his own life. Moreover, in principle
it would seem that the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented
by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a
willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even- though the
act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim. 90

The only concession the Model Penal Code is willing to
make for heartwrenching cases is "to rely upon mitigation of
sentence when the ground therefor appears." '1 But this conces"MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 10 1960), in 1 MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,§ 2.09 at 372-75 (1985).
891 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supranote 88, § 210.5 at 100.
9I0&

I& at 102. The commentary points out that § 210.5 applies "only when the actor
goes no further than aid or solicitation; if he is himself the agent of death, the crime
is murder notwithstanding the consent or even the solicitation of the deceased." Id.
at 106. However, the "homicide upon request" (i.e., active voluntary euthanasia)
could be reduced to manslaughter if the act were done "in a state of extreme emotional distress." I& Moreover, "there is power in the court to work an even larger
mitigation under Section 6.12 or even to dismiss the charge under Section 2.12 in a
really extreme case." Id.
Section 6.12 permits a judge, "having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the crime and to the history and character of the defendant," to enter judgment of
conviction for a lesser crime, and to sentence accordingly, if the judge "is of the view
that it would be unduly harsh to sentence the offender in accordance with the Code."
Id. Section 2.12, which deals with de minimis infractions, does not seem to apply at
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sion fails to mitigate the ordeal of a criminal prosecution or the
stigma of a conviction. It is almost as if those who drafted the
assisted suicide section and wrote the accompanying commentary were unaware of the sections dealing with "necessity" and
"duress" and the commentary accompanying those provisions.
I do not deny it is hard to defend an absolute prohibition
when you not only expect the prohibition to be violated in certain situations, but you can visualize circumstances where you
would understand and forgive the person who did so. The best
analogy I can think of is the absolute prohibition against torture. There, too, if we thought about it for a while, we could
envisage some dramatic individual cases where there would be
tremendous pressure to violate the prohibition, e.g., the "ticking bomb" case.
According to the press, a series of killings by terrorists has
led the Israeli government to authorize harsh interrogation of
suspected militants. The Israeli government has defended its
decision by making what some have called the "ticking bomb"
argument-underscoring the need to resort to torture to obtain
information that could prevent imminent killings. 92 But various
human-rights groups in Israel remain unconvinced that a very
few dramatic cases justify an exception to the absolute ban
against torture. They fear that once a crack appears in the absolute prohibition, the crack will eventually widen-and that torture will start taking place under circumstances far removed
from the "ticking bomb" case.
This may shock some people, but I believe that if a "ticking
bomb" case actually arose in this country--i.e., the authorities
had good cause to believe that a powerful bomb had been hidden in a huge office or government building and would explode
in the next twenty-four hours and also had reason to believe
that a person in their custody knew how, when and where this
was to occur-the authorities would not shrink from using torall. This section authorizes a court to dismiss a prosecution if, inter alia, the defendant's conduct actually caused or threatened the harm sought to be prevented "to an
extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction" or "presents such other
extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regraded as envisaged by the legislature in
forbidding the offense." Id.
9SeeJoel Greenberg, Israelis PermittingHarsher
Interrogationof Muslim Militants,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at A6; see alsoJoel Greenberg, Doctor Says Snapping of Head Killed
PalestinianHeld in Israel N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1995, at A6.
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ture. I also doubt (especially if the use of torture succeeded in
preventing an imminent disaster) that most people would want
the authorities to shrink from doing so.
For purposes of the present discussion, I need not answer
the hard question of whether it should ever be permissible for
law enforcement officials to resort to torture, e.g., to elicit information that would prevent a large explosion or some other
calamity. I need only maintain that it is a very different question
than whether we should enact a law formally sanctioning the use
of torture in certain situations. It is much easier for the government to resort to torture in less-than-compelling situations
when such methods are already formally permitted in some circumstances. On the other hand, by refusing to make any formal
or official exceptions to the prohibition against torture, or by
refusing to acknowledge that we should balance the costs and
benefits of torture as a general matter, we strengthen the presumption against torture and maximize the likelihood that it
will only be resorted to in the rarest and most compelling circumstances. s
Here, as elsewhere, it is very hard to maintain absolute prohibitions. 94 But here, as elsewhere, problems arise when one
93

See the discussion in GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ArrrruDES, AND THE LAW:
PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A LEGAL PROBLEM 167 n.240 (1985), and Charles L.
Black,Jr., Mr.JusticeBlack, the Supreme Court, and the Bill ofRights, HARPER'S, Feb. 1961,
at 63, 67-68. Both commentators discuss how we should go about deciding whether
the police may torture a prisoner to get him to reveal the location of a nuclear bomb
when the police know he has hidden the bomb somewhere in a major city and the
bomb is due to explode in a very short time.
Some may argue that the analogy to torture is not an apt one, because many
more people support an absolute prohibition against torture than do an absolute ban
against PAS/euthanasia and many more people believe that torture is inherently immoral than feel the same way about PAS/euthanasia. I hope we never have to test
these propositions in the wake of a dozen terrorists bombings in Chicago, New York
or Washington, D.C.
But consider this: In August, 1995, a terrorist blew up himself and four innocent
passengers in a bus in the heart of Jerusalem. A few days later, Israeli authorities
learned that Mr. Issa, the individual who had masterminded the suicidal bombing,
had been taken into custody two days before the incident and was still in their custody. The chief of Israel's secret service then authorized the use of "moderate physical force," and Mr. Issa provided information that led to the arrest of 37 militants who
had been planning additional bombings. The chief of Israel's secret service told the
press that the blood of the next victims of terrorism would have been on his hands if
physical pressure had not been used in the interrogation of Mr. Issa. And the Prime
Minister added that had such pressure been applied earlier, the August, 1995, bus
bombing might have been prevented. See Stephen Flatow, Israel's Fine Line, N.Y.
TIMS, May 19, 1997, atA13.
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starts carving out exceptions. I venture to say that, however
great the care with which one formulates the exceptions, "hard"
cases are bound to emerge on the other side of the line and with it
the pressure to extend the outer boundaries of the exceptions
to embrace these new "hard" cases.
Twenty years ago, on the occasion of Professor Fred Inbau's
retirement, I observed that-although happily Inbau never subscribed to this view--law professors "are supposed to be troubled and tentative, not take very strong and very clear positions
on anything (except, perhaps, right down the middle)" 95 and
that-although happily Inbau also dissented from this
view-many law professors believe that the way to enhance their
status is "by showing how agonizingly subtle and complex an issue or
a problem actually is, not by suggesting how simple it might
really be."''
Of course, when I spoke of Inbau declining to take the conventional route, I had myself in mind as well. But I never promised, or at least I never meant to promise, that I could always
show how simple seemingly subtle and complex problems really
are. Sometimes, I am afraid, what appear to be agonizingly subtle and complex problems turn out to be just that."

Was torturing Mr. Issa immoral? A United Nations committee thinks so. But an
American lawyer named Stephen Flatow does not. His daughter was killed in that
August, 1995, suicide bombing. He thinks that foregoingthe use of physical pressure
when such interrogation methods can prevent the random murder of civilians is immoral. See id.
"'Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Ynbau: "The Importance of Being Guilty," 68 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977), in YALE KAMISAR, POICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 95, 104 (1980).
Id. (emphasis in the original).
ProfessorInbau was in the audiencefor the Pope &John Lecture on Professionalism. Professor Kamisar and ProfessorInbau had dinner together (and talked about old times) following
the Lecture. ProfessorInbau passed away while this article was inpage proofs. -Eds.

